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ABSTRACT
Questions about the implications of China’s rise have loomed in 
the international system for quite some time. These questions have 
become more pertinent as China’s global and regional initiatives have 
begun to grow teeth. With these developments the eﬀects of the 
geopolitical competition between China and the United States are 
becoming more tangible, especially in Southeast Asia. Whether or not 
ASEAN’s organizational culture, loosely termed the “ASEAN Way”, 
remains viable will depend on its ability to handle increasing 
competition between large powers in the region. By necessity, ASEAN 
must become a regional powerbroker or risk becoming a broken 
regional power. This paper analyzes the strategies select ASEAN 
member states employ in their dealings with regional and world 
powers. This analysis provides a basis for exploring ASEAN’s ability 
to manage geostrategic competition in Southeast Asia. The study finds 
that, despite the diﬀering perceptions ASEAN member states have of 
the United States and China, they are unified in their search for a 
middle road that does not leave them too reliant on either actor. This 
consensus bodes well for ASEAN’s ability to handle increasing 
competition through hedging. However, if ASEAN wants to maintain 
hedging as a viable strategy, the association must work to decrease the 
development gap, curb military adventurism, and strengthen 
coordination mechanisms. 
Introduction
 Questions about the implications of China’s rise have 
loomed in the international system for quite some time. These 
questions have become more pertinent, as China’s global and 
regional initiatives have begun to grow teeth. China has 
broken ground on a few of its One Road, One Belt 
infrastructure projects and created the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) to fund future projects. With these 
developments, the effects of the geopolitical competition 
between China and the United States are becoming more 
tangible, especially in Southeast Asia.  For the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), finding its answer to the 
challenge of increasing US-Sino competition will test a great 
many aspects of the organization’s character, including 
ASEAN’s centrality and unity. 
 Recently, in Southeast Asia there has been a flurry of 
almost parallel initiatives by China and the United States, at 
times in cooperation with its regional allies, to curry 
diplomatic capital in the region. Whether or not ASEAN’s 
organizational culture, loosely termed the “ASEAN Way,” 
remains viable will depend on its ability to handle increasing 
competition between large powers in the region. By necessity, 
ASEAN must become a regional powerbroker or risk 
becoming a broken regional power. ASEAN’s reliance on 
consensus based decision making further complicates 
brokering power in the region as the process can be derailed 
by one dissenting member.
 ASEAN member states (AMS) must work jointly to 
manage regional and world power competition. If not, 
individual member states will be more susceptible to external 
interference and less able to protect their national interests. 
Moreover, a divided ASEAN will be ineffectual and 
subsequently forfeit its centrality in the regional architecture 
of Asia to other institutions or actors. 
 Since ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization, a 
thorough understanding of how individual AMS are managing 
increasing geostrategic competition is needed to fully assess 
the challenges that a US-Sino rivalry present to the region. In 
ASEAN, three geostrategic contexts exist in relation to China 
which can be grouped based on their overall perception of 
Chinese engagement. Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand are eager 
to engage with China and have few reservations about 
growing Chinese influence in the region. Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore are largely supportive of Chinese 
economic engagement, but have some strategic interests that 
are threatened by China’s growing assertiveness. Myanmar, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam not only have several strategic 
interests threatened by growing Chinese power, but also 
active disputes with the regional heavy weight.
 This paper analyzes how Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar 
manage their relations with the US and China. It is important 
to note that each of ASEAN’s ten member states employ their 
own unique strategies in dealing with great powers. However, 
this study sought to provide an overview of the strategies 
ASEAN states use to manage US-Sino competition by 
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analyzing one state from each of the region’s three 
geostrategic contexts: Malaysia, Laos, and Myanmar. This 
analysis is then used as a basis for exploring ASEAN’s ability 
to manage geostrategic competition in Southeast Asia.
Malaysia 
 Despite having overlapping territorial claims with China 
in the South China Sea, Malaysia is expanding high level 
economic and security ties with China. Conversely, Malaysia’s 
relationship with China has not proven to be an obstacle for 
developing its relationship with the US. 
 Malaysia is expanding trade partnerships with both the 
US and China. In 2013, China and Malaysia signed a five-year 
plan to increase bilateral trade to $160 billion by 2017.[1] In 
the same year, China led the US in bilateral trade with 
Malaysia, roughly $107 billion to $40 billion.[2] In 2015, 
Malaysia and the US along with ten other states across the 
Asia- Pacific (except China) concluded negotiations on the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.
 Under the new agreements and initiatives, investments 
in Malaysia will surely expand for both the US and China. As 
of 2012, the US leads China in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Malaysia, $15.5 billion to $783 million. 
[3] However, China is expanding its investments in Malaysia. 
During a recent visit to Malaysia in late November of 2015 by 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, China and Malaysia signed 
several memorandums of understanding (MoU). These 
agreements enhanced cooperation in many sectors which are 
important to China’s One Road, One Belt initiative including 
transportation and international trade.[4] As a part of the 
agreements, Port Klang, Malaysia’s busiest port and a key site 
for the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) portion of the One Road, 
One belt initiative, entered into business alliances with ten 
ports across China. Chinese investors are involved in the 
development of a deep sea terminal in Kuantan and several 
others in Melaka.[5] Shortly after Premier Li’s visit, it was 
announced that $2.3 billion of energy assets from 1Malaysia 
Development Berhad, a debt-addled state sovereign wealth 
fund, were to be purchased by the state-owned China General 
Nuclear Power Corporation. The acquisition was welcomed by 
the Malaysian government as it is in the process of 
dismantling the failed enterprise, which has amassed over $11 
billion of debt and was cited as a factor that contributed to the 
depreciation of the Malaysian Ringgit.[6] Chinese companies 
have been bidding on rail and road projects across ASEAN. In 
December 2015, a Chinese firm was awarded the $1.5 billion 
Gemas-Johor Bahru electrified double-tracking rail project.[7] 
 Malaysia maintains military ties with both the US and 
China. In September 2015, Malaysia and China had their first 
ever a joint military exercise in the Strait of Malacca. 
Codenamed “Peace and Friendship 2015,” the exercise was the 
largest to date between China and an ASEAN member state.
[8] US-Malaysian military cooperation focuses on counter-
terrorism. Malaysia allows the U.S Navy to fly its spy planes 
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from Malaysian airstrips and dock its vessels at Malaysian 
ports.[9] Moreover, Malaysia has done a fair amount to signal 
its South China Sea grievances. Unlike the states of Mainland 
Southeast Asia and American ally, South Korea, Malaysia did 
not send a top-level delegation to China’s high-profile military 
parade to commemorate the end of World War II.[10] 
Additionally, China received heavy criticism at the 2015 East 
Asian Summit, which was chaired by Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
prominent treatment of the South China Sea issues in its 
chairmen statement ran roughshod over China’s adjurations 
to keep the issues out of multilateral discussions.[11] 
 In its relations with the US and China, Malaysia follows 
an even-handed foreign policy that seeks to maximize benefits 
by keeping both powers actively engaged. Malaysia avoids 
needlessly antagonizing either big power and does not allow 
disagreements in one area to affect productive cooperation in 
another. It maintains amicable partnerships with both the US 
and China, but will judicially protect its national interest from 
encroachment by either partner.
Laos 
 Laos and Cambodia have the most pro-China tilt. 
Chinese economic influence is pervasive throughout the two 
states. Currently, western investment in these states is 
dwarfed by its Chinese counterpart.  Between 2009 and 2011, 
the US Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) provided $425 million 
to development projects in Cambodia, Laos and the three 
other states of mainland Southeast Asia.[12] Since its creation 
in 1966 through 2014, the US and Japanese-led Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) have provided $2.11 and $1.78 
billion in loans to Cambodia and Laos respectively.[13] 
However, in 2013 alone, China invested more than $2.5 
billion in each of the two States.[14] Laos will be of particular 
interest to China and the US as the 2016 chairmen of ASEAN. 
 When compared to China, the US has fewer substantial 
economic or diplomatic ties with Laos. China is Laos' largest 
export market, accounting for 46.1% of all Laos’ exports in 
2014. It is also the largest foreign investor, with $6.6 billion 
worth of investments by Chinese firms.[15] Surprisingly 
enough, even though the US has more robust ties with 
Cambodia, recent US diplomatic efforts have found a warmer 
reception in Laos. This is due to several factors: the 
government's desire to correct their over reliance on China, 
the position of Laos as the 2016 chairman of ASEAN, and 
recent political shifts that have reemphasized the country’s 
traditional political orientation towards Vietnam. 
 Recently, political shifts in Laos were on display at the 
country’s 10th Party Congress, the meeting at which the one-
party states selects its new top leaders. The Congress decided 
to replace the party chief and the deputy prime minister who 
were closely aligned with Beijing. They were staunch 
advocates of the Boten Vientiane Railway. The railway 
connects China and Thailand through Laos and is a crucial leg 
of the Chinese backed Pan-Asia Rail Network that will link 
Southwest China to Singapore.  Some government officials felt 
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the project was too much of an economic concession to China. 
The dismissal of the party chief and the deputy prime minister 
has largely been viewed as a move to lessen Chinese influence 
in Laos and a nod to the interests of Vietnam, a historical ally 
of Laos.[16] As competing Vietnamese and Chinese territorial 
claims on the Paracel Islands aggravate tensions between the 
two states, stronger political ties between Laos and Vietnam 
will serve to distance Laos from China.
 Considering the changing political climate in Laos, it 
might be premature to dismiss Laos’ commitments to ASEAN 
unity, maritime rights, and avoidance of militarization of the 
South China Sea. Former Prime Minister, Thongsing 
Thammavong, conveyed the aforementioned commitments to 
US Secretary of State John Kerry during Kerry’s recent 2016 
visit to Laos.[17] Laos is feeling fairly secure in its political 
relationship with China. While the Boten Vientiane Railway 
may turn out to be a financial liability for Laos, it has made 
Laos an indispensable part of China’s One Road, One Belt 
initiative.[18] The initiative is not just about winning friends; 
it is critical in Beijing’s plans to spur on growth in its 
underdeveloped hinterlands, prime new markets for Chinese 
goods, and  manage the economic changes stemming from 
China’s shift to a consumption based economy.[19] Right now, 
Laos is just as important to China as China is to Laos. This 
political equilibrium gives Laos the flexibility to shore up 
relations with Vietnam or explore increased cooperation with 
the US.
Myanmar
 Too often Myanmar is grouped with Laos and Cambodia 
as a Chinese satellite state. This perspective fails to take into 
account the complexities of the bilateral relations between the 
two countries, which have ranged from ambivalent, highly 
contentious to amicable. Since Myanmar's independence, the 
most constant feature of its foreign policy has been strict 
neutrality. For much of their history, Myanmar and China 
have peacefully coexisted. It has not precluded a number of 
irritants from developing over the course of their relations. 
The major irritant being Chinese support for the Burmese 
Communist Party (BCP) and later Chinese ties to the armed 
ethnic minority separatist groups that descended from the 
BCP after it was disbanded. Thus, even when Myanmar had 
warmer bilateral relations with China, engagement on 
Yangon’s part always included a healthy amount of caution 
and a fair amount of suspicion.[20] Myanmar has a 
longstanding interest in diversifying its international ties 
away from China. Until recently many avenues to developing 
international ties with Western states were closed to 
Myanmar because of international opposition to Myanmar’s 
military junta. However, political reforms by Myanmar’s new 
civilian government are opening up new diplomatic 
opportunities that were previously closed to Myanmar. 
 Myanmar was forced to compromise its principle of 
strategic neutrality in 1988 after the government’s violent 
suppression of a series of pro-democracy protest called the 
8888 Uprising. The suppression of the protest left Myanmar a 
81
pariah state in the West, forcing it into an alliance of 
convenience with China.  Strategic political alignment with 
China always ran counter to the better judgment of Yangon. 
By the early 2000’s, Myanmar was already trying to reduce its 
dependence on China by exploring military ties with Russia. 
[21] In 2011, after Thein Sein became Myanmar’s first civilian 
President in nearly 50 years, diplomatic decision making 
became a subject to more domestic pressure. It was domestic 
anti-Chinese sentiments that ultimately led Thein Sein to 
suspend the Chinese backed Myitsone dam mega project.[22] 
This decision marked Myanmar’s return to a neutrality 
centered foreign policy and the end of its strategic alignment 
with China. 
 Since Myanmar’s 2011 transition to a civilian 
government, it has had substantial engagements with both the 
US and China. China continues to have a large economic foot 
print in Myanmar. It supplied 42% of $33.67 billion of foreign 
investment between 1988 and 2013.[23] However, many of 
the Chinese mega projects associated with these investments 
have met with substantial resistance. Some projects, like the 
Myanmar-China pipelines and the Letpadaung mine, 
continued, albeit under increased government scrutiny and 
public protest.[24][25] On the other hand, the Myitsone Dam 
and Kunming-Kyaukphyu Railway were out right cancelled, 
much to the dismay of Beijing. However, the revival of the 
Chinese backed deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu shows that 
Myanmar and Chinese cooperation in the area of 
infrastructure is set to endure despite changes in the political 
climate.[26]
 China’s relations with several of Myanmar’s armed 
ethnic rebel groups are also a constant irritant in bilateral 
relations. Chinese ties with the rebel groups revolve around 
the lucrative smuggling of jade, timber, and gems. Illegal 
timber exports are estimated at nearly $2 billion per year.[27] 
Officials in the Myanmar government have accused China of 
providing assistance to the Kokang rebel group, who has been 
engaged in intense fighting with Myanmar’s military for the 
past year.[28] China is also suspected of using its influence 
over other rebel groups, the Wa State Army and Kachin 
Independence Army, to obstruct Myanmar’s efforts to 
negotiate a nationwide cease fire deal. It has taken issue with 
the cease fire deal as it may include a provision that would 
invite Japanese and Western observers into the peace process.
[29] Chinese and rebel representatives have denied the 
charges. The truth of the reports aside, they highlight very real 
tensions in Myanmar-Sino relations.   
 As Myanmar’s ties to China begin to fray about the 
edges, their ties with the US are being judiciously woven 
tighter.  The US restored full diplomatic relations with 
Myanmar in 2012 after ties were severed in 1989.  However, 
relations began recovering in 2000 when the US started 
providing humanitarian assistance to Burma. US 
Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar was increased in 2008, 
following Cyclone Nargis. Between 2008 and 2012, the US 
provided $196 million in assistance to Myanmar and over 
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$500 million since 2012.[30] Over the past three years, 
Western-led financial institutions, the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, have provided more than $3.8 billion for 
the development of infrastructure and human services. Trade 
with Myanmar remains modest, but doubled from 2014 to 
2015 to $371.2 million. While the US has concerns about the 
pace of reforms, sectarian violence against the Rohingya, and 
the progress of reconciliation with ethnic groups, the US is 
employing a calibrated engagement strategy that recognizes 
the positive steps Myanmar has already undertaken to 
incentivize further reforms.[31] According to the policy, if 
Myanmar diligently continues to strengthen its democratic 
institutions and address the country’s unsettled ethnic 
problems in a proactive and peaceful manner, the U.S. will 
deepen its ties with Myanmar and thereby, bolstering its 
capacity to act as a much welcomed counterbalance to China.
 Myanmar stands to gain a lot from engagement with 
both China and the West. How it manages the balance of its 
relationship with external powers will depend heavily on the 
decisions of the newly elected government, led by Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Suu Kyi’s meeting 
with Chinese president Xi Jinping in China in summer 2015 
highlighted China’s desire to build rapport with the new 
government. Myanmar’s strategic location, as the land bridge 
between South and Southeast Asia, makes it an important 
stop on China’s MSR. Similarly, Myanmar’s pipelines make it 
vital to China’s energy security. Thus, China has ample 
incentive to remain a friend to Myanmar. Myanmar, on the 
other hand, is reevaluating the terms of its friendship with 
Beijing. The potential gains from increasing business ties with 
the West, the need to correct an over-dependence on Beijing 
and Washington’s steadfast support of Myanmar’s 
democratically elected government puts a slight Western tilt 
on the balance of Myanmar’s hedging strategy.
Conclusion 
 This analysis demonstrates that the member states of 
ASEAN are navigating a middle road between the regional 
interests of the US and China regardless of their perceptions 
of Chinese power. This approach is referred to as “hedging”. 
This bodes well for the ability of ASEAN to manage great 
power competition in the region because the use of hedging 
strategies is not only beneficial for individual ASEAN states, 
but also the Association as a whole. The fact that all the 
ASEAN member states are using the same strategy, albeit with 
substantial individual modifications, lessens the difficulty of 
reaching a consensus should great power competition begin to 
pose an imminent threat to the interests of the region. 
However, this only mitigates and does not eliminate the 
complications ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making 
poses to managing great power competition in the region. A 
glaring example of this is the failure of ASEAN to produce a 
joint statement during its 2012 summit because of differing 
opinions on the South China Sea dispute.
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 Acknowledging its limitations, hedging is a prudent 
strategy for ASEAN because it is less about countering the US 
or China and is more focused on managing the inherent risks 
of relations with any hegemonic or emerging power. Hedging 
allows ASEAN, as an association and separate member states, 
to remain nimble in their foreign policy. Therefore, ASEAN 
can effectively respond to the possibilities of a bellicose China 
or a countermand of the importance the Obama 
administration assigned to the region while maximizing the 
benefits of their engagement with more powerful 
international actors. 
 ASEAN member states cannot only be concerned about 
maximizing the gains they receive from their hedging 
strategies. They must also be concerned about maintaining an 
international environment, in which hedging remains a viable 
foreign policy. Hedging only remains viable if the 
international arrangement in Southeast Asia is acceptable to 
both the US and China. Currently, the US cannot accept 
Chinese hegemony in Asia; therefore, it seeks to preserve its 
military primacy in the Asia-Pacific.  Conversely, China 
cannot accept continued US primacy in the region and 
accordingly contests US primacy which, if successful, would 
leave China well positioned to become a regional hegemon. In 
order to maintain a regional environment conducive to 
hedging, ASEAN must support a US presence in the region 
that is capable of preventing Chinese hegemony, but not 
strong enough to maintain US primacy.[32] This is not an 
easy equilibrium to find. Both China and the US are willing to 
divide ASEAN rather than lose the whole region to their rival. 
In the wake of increasing great power competition, ASEAN 
must promote policies that support its internal unity. 
 ASEAN’s first step in finding a balance between US 
primacy and Chinese hegemony is internal. ASEAN must 
continuously work to increase interregional trade and 
investment, especially between the more developed ASEAN 
states and the region’s lesser developed states, namely 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Increasing inter-
ASEAN economic ties goes hand in hand with narrowing the 
development gap. These economic links encourage the lesser 
developed countries of ASEAN to link national prosperity to 
regional interests rather than the good graces of extra regional 
powers.
 The second step is external. ASEAN should not be a 
party to or condone military adventurism in the region by any 
external actors. This includes the recent freedom of 
navigation exercises conducted by the US in the South China 
Sea. These actions have been tacitly endorsed by Vietnam, 
while The Philippines seeks to join the US patrols.[33][34] 
ASEAN can challenge Chinese claims in the South China Sea 
without antagonizing the behemoth nation and legitimizing 
its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, which brings 
us to the final step. 
 Finally, ASEAN needs mechanisms to coordinate foreign 
policy when facing great power competition. Increasing 
competition will require increased coordination. As it 
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happens, competition is most definitely increasing at the 
moment. Some might argue that joint proclamations carry 
little weight to dissuade the machinations of the world's 
largest powers. However, the strategic value of ASEAN is 
increasing by the day, especially for China. With every 
Maritime Silk Road project completed ASEAN becomes a 
more important partner in China's economic development 
and energy security. ASEAN proclamations backed up by 
unity and resolve carry more weight than the world has yet to 
realize. This proposal is controversial as it might infringe 
upon the national sovereignty and independence so jealously 
guarded by ASEAN Member States. However, a coordinated 
response will be necessary to disallow the divide and conquer 
strategies employed in the great games of powerful nations. If 
a great game is played in Southeast Asia, its nations will be 
subjected to the interference, subversion and coercion ASEAN 
was created to guard against
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